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This study investigates the visual self-presentation of political candidates on different 
social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter) in seven Western 
democracies (Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States). Drawing on Grabe and Bucy’s visual framing approach, I conducted a 
quantitative content analysis of visual social media posts (N = 2,272) of the top two 
candidates who ran for the chief executive governmental office in the respective election 
campaigns. The results reveal that candidates are more likely to use the ideal candidate 
frame than that of the populist campaigner. The use of visual frames differs significantly 
among countries, but those differences are limited. It seems that differences among 
candidates within countries are more pronounced than among countries. The results also 
indicate that Instagram is the preferred platform for visual self-presentation. This study 
provides insights into the strategic use of visuals in social media campaigning. 
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Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in investigating the role of visuals in 
election campaigns (Coleman & Wu, 2015; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Veneti, Jackson, & Lilleker, 2019). 
Because visuals are ubiquitous in politics, voters are confronted with an enormous number of visuals of 
political candidates in news coverage, in political advertising, and, more recently, on social media 
platforms (Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Esser, 2008; Holtz-Bacha & Johansson, 2017; Lalancette & Raynauld, 
2019). Visuals are an excellent source of political information; they are processed quickly, are more 
memorable than textual materials, and are able to affect political judgments. Based on a variety of 
studies, it is now well established that voters rely on visual cues, such as physical attractiveness, when 
evaluating political candidates’ character traits and making voting-related decisions (Ahler, Citrin, Dougal, 
& Lenz, 2017; Banducci, Karp, Thrasher, & Rallings, 2008; Verhulst, Lodge, & Lavine, 2010). Given that 
visual representation has become increasingly important in election campaigns, candidates try to portray 
themselves positively and use visual frames to mobilize and convince voters to support them (Grabe & 
Bucy, 2009; Marland, 2012). 
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With the advent of social media platforms, candidates have new opportunities to visually present 
themselves and communicate directly with voters without journalistic intervention. Although there has 
been an increasing amount of literature on political candidates’ visual self-presentation in recent years 
(Cmeciu, 2014; Farci & Orefice, 2015; Filimonov, Russmann, & Svensson, 2016; Goodnow, 2013; Liebhart 
& Bernhardt, 2017; Muñoz & Towner, 2017), more attention has been paid to the analysis of textual 
elements (Colliander et al., 2017; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Meeks, 2016). Studies that have investigated 
political candidates’ visual self-presentation are generally limited to a single country, specifically the 
United States, and a single social media platform. Consequently, there is a lack of cross-national 
comparative studies analyzing candidates’ visual self-presentation across different platforms during 
election campaigns. On the one hand, this is important because countries have different political systems, 
media systems, and social media penetration rates. On the other hand, social media platforms have their 
own characteristics and differ significantly regarding their audiences, digital architecture, and genres of 
communication (Bossetta, 2018; Kreiss, Lawrence, & McGregor, 2018). The present study therefore tries 
to fill this gap by applying Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) visual framing approach and investigating the official 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter profiles of the top two candidates who ran for the chief executive 
governmental office in national election campaigns of seven Western democracies: Austria, Canada, 
France, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
This study adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, it provides insights into the 
strategic use of visuals on social media platforms by political candidates in electoral campaigns. Second, 
by taking a comparative perspective, the study finds it possible to identify transnational similarities and 
nation-specific differences in candidates’ visual self-presentation. Finally, the study sheds light on how 
candidates use different social media platforms in a variety of ways to visually present themselves. Thus, 
it contributes to cross-platform social media research on political campaigning. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: In the first part, the literature on political candidates’ self-
presentation in election campaigns, which often focuses on textual elements, is reviewed. The second part 
of this article reviews the concept of visual framing and describes in greater detail Grabe and Bucy’s 
(2009) analysis of visual character frames, which is central to this study. The third part is concerned with 
the methodology used for this study. The fourth part presents the results of the quantitative content 
analysis, focusing on the use of visual frames in general and the differences among countries and social 
media platforms. Finally, the implications of the results, limitations of the study, and suggestions for 
future research are discussed. 
 
Political Candidates’ Self-Presentation in Election Campaigns 
 
In election campaigns, candidates are particularly motivated to project an appealing image of 
themselves and maximize the impact on voters. Researchers have therefore provided several concepts to 
explain candidates’ self-presentation in politics. The theory of self-presentation was first articulated by 
Goffman (1959) and popularized in his book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Self-presentation 
refers to how individuals attempt to create and claim a desired image in social interactions. Goffman 
(1959) regarded the setting of social interaction as a stage and distinguished between “front stage” and 
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“back stage” behavior. The front stage is what is visible to an audience, whereas the back stage is what is 
hidden from others. 
 
Regarding politics, the theory of self-presentation was first applied to face-to-face communication 
(Fenno, 1978) and traditional media (Schütz, 1993), but then expanded to digitally mediated 
communication such as candidate websites (Gulati, 2004; Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013; Stanyer, 2008) 
and, more recently, candidate social media profiles (Colliander et al., 2017; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; 
Meeks, 2016). Using Goffman’s notion of self-presentation, Fenno (1978) examined how members of the 
United States Congress present themselves to their voters and distinguished between a “home style” and 
a “Washington style.” The former represents candidates’ self-presentation when they are interacting with 
voters in their districts, and the latter describes candidates’ behavior when they are on Capitol Hill. 
Similarly, Gulati (2004) found two different presentation styles in his analysis of congressional websites: 
“Washington insiders” and “Washington outsiders.” Insiders convey the impression that they are influential 
and powerful, whereas outsiders communicate the impression that they have not lost touch with ordinary 
people. In a study investigating online self-presentation by politicians in the United States and United 
Kingdom, Stanyer (2008) reported that members of the U.S. House of Representatives promote their 
private life more often on their websites than members of the British Parliament (MPs). Stanyer (2008) 
argued that U.S. politicians, in contrast to British politicians, cannot rely on voters’ party loyalty and 
therefore must focus on their personal qualities. Another comparative study conducted by Lilleker and 
Koc-Michalska (2013) has revealed that members of the European Parliament (MEPs) predominantly 
pursue a home style strategy on their official websites. To a lesser extent, MEPs have made use of a 
personalized impression management strategy, whereas a participatory communication strategy was 
pursued primarily by young MEPs. In recent years, researchers have shown an increasing interest in 
candidates’ self-presentation on social media platforms generally, and on Twitter specifically. For instance, 
Jackson and Lilleker (2011) demonstrated in their analysis that British MPs use Twitter as a tool for 
political marketing and image control. The authors found that MPs tweeted about personal preferences, 
their everyday lives, and their political positions. In an experimental study investigating the effects of 
different self-presentation styles, Colliander et al. (2017) reported that Swedish candidates whose tweets 
combine aspects of their professional and private lives increase voters’ interest in the candidate’s party 
and the likelihood that they will vote for that party, when compared with tweets that include professional 
content only. 
 
Together, these studies provide important insights into the campaign communication strategies of 
candidates. However, all the studies reviewed here focus primarily on verbal statements or textual 
elements. So far, less attention has been paid to the role of visuals, although social media platforms 
encourage visual content; that is, images and videos receive increased visibility in the newsfeed (Bucher, 
2012). As social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are increasingly dominated by visual content 
(Towner, 2017), research on candidates’ self-presentation needs to go beyond the textual level and 
consider visuals. Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in investigating political 
candidates’ visual self-presentation on social media platforms. For instance, Farci and Orefice (2015) 
found that candidates use selfies as a strategic self-promotion tool and that selfies are the latest way of 
“crafting the self” through the use of digital technology. Liebhart and Bernhardt (2017) demonstrated that 
candidates in election campaigns use Instagram to visually present themselves as legitimate office 
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holders. With regard to the visual level, however, one has to consider that a clear separation between 
front stage and back stage behavior is rarely possible. For instance, numerous visual social media posts of 
Justin Trudeau show the Canadian prime minister together with his wife and children at official events 
such as state receptions (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019). Even though a state reception takes place in a 
professional context, the boundaries between the professional and private life of the politician become 
blurred. Candidates have the ability to select and emphasize some aspects of their character, while 
neglecting others. By using visuals, those “character frames” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 101) build 
candidates’ social identity. Visual framing is therefore a useful concept to analyze candidates’ visual self-
presentation on social media platforms. This study relies on Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) visual-framing 
approach. Grabe and Bucy’s theoretical framework is appropriate because their study of political 
candidates’ depiction in television coverage focuses also on image management strategies, which promote 
desired candidate qualities. It can be assumed that campaign strategists aim to exercise control over the 
visual-framing process—in news coverage and on social media platforms. Recent studies have shown that 
their theoretical framework can be adapted to social media (Cmeciu, 2014; Goodnow, 2013; Muñoz & 
Towner, 2017). By applying Grabe and Bucy’s theoretical framework in the social media context, the 





Traditionally, research on framing has predominantly concentrated on texts even though visuals 
play an important role in media communications. However, in recent years, a considerable literature has 
grown around the theme of visual framing (Brantner, Geise, & Lobinger, 2013; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; 
Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). Visual framing can be understood as a process of highlighting certain 
aspects of a perceived reality to promote a particular interpretation of a specific issue, event, or person 
(Coleman, 2010; Entman, 1993). 
 
Reviewing the existing literature on visual framing, Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011) identified 
four approaches to visual framing: (1) the denotative approach, (2) the stylistic-semiotic approach, (3) 
the connotative approach, and (4) the ideological approach. The denotative approach refers to the persons 
or objects and discrete elements actually depicted in the visual. The stylistic-semiotic approach refers to 
the stylistic choices (e.g., camera angle, camera distance, and color) and pictorial conventions (e.g., social 
distance) in the visual. The connotative approach refers to the analysis of figurative symbols and visual 
metaphors, whereas the ideological approach takes into account the latent meanings of the visual frames. 
Recently, researchers have combined several approaches to visual framing (Dan, 2018; Wozniak, Lück, & 
Wessler, 2015). For example, Hellmueller and Zhang (2019) combined denotative, stylistic-semiotic, 
connotative, and ideological approaches in their visual framing analysis of the coverage of refugees on 
CNN and Spiegel Online. Given that the present study derives two visual frames (i.e., the ideal candidate 
frame and the populist campaigner frame) deductively from Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) visual framing 
analysis and investigates the extent to which these visual character frames appear in the sample, I follow 
a denotative deductive approach. Although some researchers also suggest applying a stylistic-semiotic 
perspective and including structural features in visual framing analyses (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018), this 
study focuses on the content of visual frames and investigates what is depicted in candidates’ visual social 
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media posts. Because this study draws on Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) visual framing analysis, a more 
detailed account of their visual character frames and the state of research regarding the application of 
these frames for social media analyses is presented next. 
 
In studying the visual coverage of U.S. presidential election campaigns from 1992 to 2004, 
Grabe and Bucy (2009) identified three visual frames: the ideal candidate, the populist campaigner, and 
the sure loser. The ideal candidate frame refers to characteristics that are crucial for the exercise of the 
office and consists of two dimensions: statesmanship and compassion. Depicting as a statesman and 
compassionate leader is based on the assumption that voters have “a mental picture of specific 
characteristics that an ideal presidential candidate should have” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 102). Previous 
research has indicated that characteristics such as statesmanlike traits and compassion are relevant 
criteria for assessing candidates (Kinder, 1986). Statesmanship is depicted through visuals of “power, 
authority, control, and active leadership” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 102), and compassion is represented 
through visuals of “children and families” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 104). The populist campaigner frame 
builds “on the idea that ordinary people, a noble troupe, stand in opposition to an aristocratic and self-
serving elite” (Grabe & Bucy, 2009, p. 105). By depicting as a populist campaigner, candidates 
demonstrate closeness to the people. They portray themselves as an average person who understands 
the needs of ordinary people. Populist framing comprises the dimensions of mass appeal and 
ordinariness. Whereas the former is visually depicted through linkages to celebrities or massive, 
approving audiences, the latter displays candidates wearing informal attire (casual or sports clothing), 
interacting with ordinary people, and performing physical work. Finally, the sure loser frame depicts 
candidates in unfavorable situations, highlighting missteps in the campaign. Loser framing is visually 
represented through small or disapproving audiences or defiant gestures. Grabe and Bucy (2009) 
demonstrated in their analysis that Republicans were more often framed as ideal candidates, whereas 
Democrats were typically shown in a populist frame. 
 
Although Grabe and Bucy (2009) examined candidates’ depiction in television coverage, several 
researchers have applied their approach to candidates’ visual self-presentation on social media platforms. 
However, these studies did not consider the loser frame because it is unlikely that candidates would 
purposefully present themselves in a negative light on their social media profiles. For instance, Goodnow’s 
(2013) semiotic analysis of Obama and Romney’s Facebook photos during the 2012 U.S. presidential 
election campaign revealed that both men framed themselves as ideal candidates, although they used 
different strategies. Regarding mass appeal, no differences among the candidates could be found. Cmeciu 
(2014) analyzed Facebook photos of Romanian candidates running for the 2014 European Parliament 
elections and found that they were using the ideal candidate frame more often than that of the populist 
campaigner. The author further found that the statesmanship dimension was more visible than the 
compassion dimension within the ideal candidate frame and that the ordinariness dimension dominated 
the populist frame. Similarly, Muñoz and Towner (2017) demonstrated in their analysis of U.S. presidential 
primary candidates’ Instagram profiles that the ideal candidate frame was preferred to the populist frame 
and received the most likes and comments from users. Based on this research, I hypothesize the 
following: 
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H1: Political candidates are more likely to use the ideal candidate frame than the populist campaigner 
frame on their official social media profiles. 
 
Most research on candidates’ visual representation on social media is based on single-country 
studies, particularly data from the United States. Though these studies clearly contribute to an increase in 
knowledge, their results cannot be easily generalized to other countries (Vaccari, 2013). Contextual 
factors such as the political and media system, political culture, technological developments, campaign 
professionalization, incumbency advantage, or economic resources might affect political campaigning in 
general, and candidates’ social media campaigning in particular (Esser & Strömbäck, 2012). One exception 
is Lee’s (2016) comparative study of website photos of U.S. President Obama and South Korean President 
Lee. The study demonstrated that the visual representation of the two presidents differed significantly. 
Whereas the South Korean president framed himself visually as a statesman, Obama not only relied on 
the statesmanship frame, but also emphasized populist frames such as mass appeal and ordinariness. 
Studying political candidates’ visual representation from a comparative perspective therefore may extend 
our understanding of social media campaigning. However, given the paucity of relevant research regarding 
the influence of country characteristics on candidates’ use of visual frames on social media platforms in 
election campaigns, I ask the following research question: 
 
RQ1: To what extent does the use of visually constructed frames differ among countries? 
 
Usually, studies on candidates’ visual self-presentation in election campaigns are single-platform 
studies. In hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2017), however, candidates use a multitude of social media 
platforms. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have their own characteristics and differ 
significantly in terms of audience, digital architecture, and genre of communication (Bossetta, 2018; 
Kreiss et al., 2018). Facebook (2019) for instance, has 1.6 billion daily active users and is a particularly 
attractive and important platform for political campaigning because of its potentially wide reach. 
Candidates may use Facebook as a tool for partisan-, mass-, target group–, and individual-centered 
campaigns to address different audiences (Magin, Podschuweit, Haßler, & Russmann, 2017). Compared 
with Facebook, the photo and video-sharing platform Instagram is particularly popular among young 
users. Instagram (2019) has more than 500 million daily active users worldwide, and more than two 
thirds are aged 34 years and younger. In view of its visual nature, Instagram is per se a suitable platform 
for candidates’ visual self-presentation and may be used to address young voters. Twitter (2019) has 139 
million daily active users, a significantly smaller audience than Facebook and Instagram. However, the 
platform is primarily used by political and journalistic elites. Within it, candidates release campaign details, 
promote themselves, and interact with other politicians or journalists (Jungherr, 2016). By addressing 
journalists, candidates aim to set the agenda and influence campaign coverage. 
 
It has been argued that candidates create their own content for different social media platforms 
to reach and influence specific target audiences (Kreiss et al., 2018). Whereas some studies (Stier, Bleier, 
Lietz, & Strohmaier, 2018) have suggested that candidates tailor their content to any one particular 
platform, Bossetta’s (2018) research questioned this assumption. The author found, rather, “an overlap in 
campaign messages across all of the platforms studied” (Bossetta, 2018, p. 491) and concluded that 
“scholars should not assume that political content issued on a social media platform is necessarily specific 
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to it” (p. 486). This raises the question of whether candidates share the same images across platforms, or 
whether differences can be identified in candidates’ use of visual frames. Therefore, I formulate the 
following second research question: 
 




To test the hypothesis and answer the research questions, I conducted a quantitative content 
analysis of visual social media posts by 14 political candidates from seven Western democracies: Austria, 
Canada, France, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The countries were 
selected by the following criteria: (a) political system characteristics, (b) media system characteristics, 
and (c) social media use. 
 
Comprising a presidential government system (the United States), a semipresidential government 
system (France), and five parliamentary government systems (Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway, and 
the United Kingdom), the sample provides sufficient variation regarding the political system. The countries 
also differ significantly in their electoral systems: Whereas some employ majoritarian electoral systems 
(the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France), others use proportional electoral systems 
(Austria and Norway). Germany’s mixed-member proportional electoral system allows two votes: one for a 
constituency candidate and the second for a party list. Further, the countries have different party 
systems: The United States has a two-party system; the United Kingdom has a two-and-a-half-party 
system; and Austria, Canada, France, Germany, and Norway have multiparty systems. 
 
With respect to the media system, the countries also exhibit considerable variation. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada belong to the liberal model; Germany, Austria, and Norway have 
democratic corporatist models; and France is part of the polarized pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004). 
 
Moreover, the countries differ significantly in terms of social media use: Norway has the highest 
active social media penetration (71%), followed by the United States (70%), and the United Kingdom and 
Canada (67% each). Austria has a significantly lower active social media penetration rate (50%), and 
Germany shows the lowest level (46%; Statista, 2019). Finally, the country selection was guided by 
candidates’ active use of different social media platforms in their respective election campaigns. Each 
candidate included in the sample had to be simultaneously active on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. 
Altogether, the selected countries are similar in some respects, but they provide sufficient variation with 
regard to political and media system characteristics as well as social media use. 
 
For each country, I selected the following top two candidates who ran for the chief executive 
government office: Christian Kern and Sebastian Kurz (Austria); Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau 
(Canada); Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron (France); Angela Merkel and Martin Schulz (Germany); 
Erna Solberg and Jonas Gahr Støre (Norway); Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn (United Kingdom); and 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump (United States). 
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The content analysis covers the last four weeks of the election campaign in each country. The 
visual social media posts (i.e., images and infographics) for the content analysis were collected in October 
2018. I selected visual social media posts that were distributed on the official Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter profiles of the candidates mentioned earlier. In line with previous studies (Muñoz & Towner, 2017), 
videos were excluded. Units of analysis were visual social media posts in which the candidate was 
depicted. Of the 2,833 visual social media posts collected in the period under investigation, 2,272 posts 
display the candidate. Table 1 provides an overview of the sample, including candidates, time period, 
candidates’ post by social media platform, and a total of candidates’ posts. 
 
Table 1. Samples. 
Countries Candidates Time Period 
Candidates’ Posts by Social Media 
Platform Candidates’ 
Total Posts Facebook Instagram Twitter 
Austria  Christian Kern 09/18/2017–10/15/2017 51 21 3 75 
Sebastian Kurz 25 39 88 152 
Canada Stephen Harper 09/21/2015–10/19/2015 275 73 17 365 
Justin Trudeau 78 6 4 88 
France Marine Le Pen 04/10/2017–05/07/2017 75 25 224 324 
Emmanuel Macron 27 39 3 69 
Germany Angela Merkel 08/28/2017–09/24/2017 185 8 18 211 
Martin Schulz 30 31 46 107 
Norway Erna Solberg 08/14/2017–09/11/2017 47 7 1 55 
Jonas Gahr Støre 62 7 1 70 
UK Theresa May 05/11/2017–06/08/2017 35 26 39 100 
Jeremy Corbyn 54 40 166 260 
U.S. Hillary Clinton 10/11/2016–11/08/2016 59 43 68 170 
Donald Trump 75 73 78 266 
Total   1,078 438 756 2,272 
 
The coding of the visual social media posts was conducted by four trained coders. To assess 
intercoder reliability, a randomly selected subsample of 227 posts was coded. By using Krippendorff’s 
alpha for calculating intercoder reliability, I found satisfactory reliability scores (see Appendix). 
 
To measure the visual frames, I used Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) coding schema originally 
developed for the visual framing analysis of U.S. presidential candidates in television coverage. As 
alluded to previously, the authors identified three visual frames: the ideal candidate, the populist 
campaigner, and the sure loser. In accordance with previous studies (Cmeciu, 2014; Goodnow, 2013; 
Muñoz & Towner, 2017), I did not consider the sure loser frame in this analysis because it is unlikely 
that candidates choose to present themselves negatively on their own social media profiles. The ideal 
candidate frame consists of the dimensions statesmanship and compassion. Statesmanship was 
measured using the following set of binary variables (0 = absence, 1 = presence): (a) elected officials, 
(b) patriotic symbols, (c) symbols of progress, (d) identifiable entourage, (e) campaign paraphernalia, 
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(f) political hoopla, and (g) formal attire. Compassion was measured using seven binary variables: (a) 
children, (b) family associations, (c) admiring women, (d) religious symbols, (e) affinity gestures, (f) 
interaction with individuals, and (g) physical embraces. The populist campaigner frame consists of the 
dimensions mass appeal and ordinariness. Mass appeal was measured using the following four binary 
variables: (a) celebrities, (b) large audiences, (c) approving audiences, and (d) interaction with crowds. 
Finally, ordinariness was measured by using the following five binary variables: (a) informal attire, (b) 
casual dress, (c) athletic clothing, (d) ordinary people, and (e) physical activity. 
 
For the analysis of the data, I first created an additive index for each visual frame. Second, I 
tested whether there were significant differences among the seven countries on the use of the visual 
frames by using analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Bonferroni post hoc tests. I used the countries as 
factor and the visual frames as dependent variables. Third, I conducted ANOVAs for each social media 




Before testing the hypothesis and answering the research questions, I will present the 
descriptive analyses of individual variables and visual frames. As Table 2 indicates, the mean scores for 
both variables and frames varied widely. Within the dimension of statesmanship, the variable formal 
attire scored the highest mean, followed by the variable campaign paraphernalia. Higher means were 
also recorded for the variables identifiable entourage and patriotic symbols. The variables with the 
lowest means were elected officials, political hoopla, and symbols of progress. Within the dimension of 
compassion, the variables admiring women, physical embraces, children, and interaction with crowds 
showed the highest means. Variables with lower means were affinity gestures and family associations. 
The variable religious symbols exhibited the lowest mean. Within the dimension of mass appeal, the 
variable large audiences scored the highest mean, followed by approving audiences. The variable 
interaction with crowds scored relatively low values, and the variable celebrities scored the lowest 
mean. Within the dimension of ordinariness, the variable ordinary people had the highest mean. The 
variable informal attire had the second highest mean score. In contrast, the variables casual dress, 
physical activity, and athletic clothing had the lowest means. 
 
Comparing the use of the statesmanship dimension and the compassion dimension, a paired t 
test showed significant differences between the two dimensions of the ideal candidate frame, t(2,271) 
= 35.01, p < .001. Political candidates presented themselves more as statesmen than as 
compassionate leaders. Within the populist frame, the mass appeal dimension was significantly more 
salient than the ordinariness dimension for the candidates studied, t(2,271) = 11.43, p < .001. 
 
Next, I turn to the formal test of the hypothesis. H1 stated that political candidates are more 
likely to use the ideal candidate frame than the populist campaigner frame. A t test revealed that there 
was a significant difference in the scores for the ideal candidate frame and the populist frame, t(2,271) 
= 10.17, p < .001. Political candidates presented themselves significantly more often having ideal 
attributes than populist traits. Thus, H1 is supported. 
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Table 2. Visual Frames in Seven National Election Campaigns. 
Frame Dimension Variable M (SD) 
Ideal Candidate   2.62 (1.47) 
 Statesmanship  1.83 (1.11) 
  Elected officials 0.05 (0.21) 
  Patriotic symbols 0.23 (0.42) 
  Symbols of progress 0.02 (0.15) 
  Identifiable entourage 0.29 (0.45) 
  Campaign paraphernalia 0.44 (0.50) 
  Political hoopla 0.05 (0.22) 
  Formal attire 0.76 (0.43) 
 Compassion  0.79 (0.93) 
  Children 0.14 (0.34) 
  Family associations 0.07 (0.26) 
  Admiring women 0.18 (0.34) 
  Religious symbols 0.02 (0.12) 
  Affinity gestures 0.10 (0.30) 
  Interaction with individuals 0.13 (0.33) 
  Physical embraces 0.16 (0.37) 
Populist Campaigner   1.37 (1.20) 
 Mass Appeal  0.76 (1.00) 
  Celebrities 0.04 (0.19) 
  Large audiences 0.38 (0.49) 
  Approving audiences 0.25 (0.43) 
  Interaction with crowds 0.10 (0.30) 
    
 Ordinariness  0.61 (0.70) 
  Informal attire 0.21 (0.41) 
  Casual dress 0.04 (0.19) 
  Athletic clothing 0.00 (0.06) 
  Ordinary people 0.33 (0.47) 
  Physical activity 0.03 (0.17) 
Note. N = 2,272. 
 
Comparing the ways that visual self-presentation strategies are used in the countries studied, I 
now turn to cross-national differences in the use of visual frames on candidates’ social media platforms. In 
the first stage, I show differences in the use of visual frames among candidates within countries, and in a 
second step, I then examine variations among countries. 
 
First, in the United States, Donald Trump framed himself significantly more often as an ideal 
candidate than Hillary Clinton, F(1, 394) = 12.21, p < .001. Particularly, the statesman score was higher 
for Trump than Clinton, F(1, 394) = 32.44, p < .001. This can be traced back to his frequent use of 
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patriotic symbols and campaign paraphernalia in his visual social media posts (Figure 1). Moreover, Trump 
was always dressed in a suit and tie, which added to his ideal candidate image. However, a closer 
inspection of the compassion dimension did not reveal significant differences. Regarding populist framing, 
Trump and Clinton used the dimensions of mass appeal and ordinariness almost equally. Interestingly, 
both candidates avoided depictions of themselves as “ordinary.” What is striking is the discrepancy 
between Trump’s visual self-presentation on social media platforms and his public image and rhetorical 
strategy. Although Trump is often characterized in the traditional media and in political communication 
research as a “populist” who makes use of populist discourse (Oliver & Rahn, 2016), he relied rather 




Figure 1. Screenshot of a tweet by Donald Trump illustrating ideal candidate  
framing (statesmanship dimension). 
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In Germany, Martin Schulz, the chancellor candidate of the Social Democratic Party, relied 
significantly more often on the ideal candidate frame than Chancellor Angela Merkel, F(1, 316) = 6.37, p 
< .01. Even though the statesman score was higher for Merkel than Schulz, the difference was not 
statistically significant. Depicting herself as a statesman emphasized Merkel’s powerful and influential role 
in world politics. In her images, she always wore a pantsuit, and she often appeared with other elected 
officials and her political entourage. In contrast, Schulz appeared significantly more compassionate than 
Merkel, F(1, 316) = 27.20, p < .001. Interacting with children and voters added to his image as an ideal 
candidate (Figure 2). Moreover, Schulz showed significantly more populist traits than Merkel, F(1, 316) = 
8.34, p < .01. For instance, he was linked to large and approving audiences significantly more often than 
Merkel. However, there were no significant differences between Merkel and Schulz regarding ordinariness. 




Figure 2. Screenshot of an Instagram post by Martin Schulz illustrating ideal candidate framing 
(compassion dimension). 
 
In Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper presented himself as significantly more statesmanlike, 
F(1, 451) = 15.03, p < .001, and as possessing more ideal qualities overall than his challenger Justin 
Trudeau, F(1, 451) = 4.22, p < .05. This visual strategy lines up with Harper’s role as president. No 
significant differences were found among the candidates regarding the compassion dimension. Trudeau, 
however, displayed significantly more populist traits than Harper, F(1, 451) = 9.30, p < .01. He further 
outscored his contender on all mass appeal variables (Figure 3). Specifically, Trudeau had focused more on 
large and approving audiences. Considering Harper’s and Trudeau’s depictions as ordinary people, there 
were no significant differences in how the candidates presented themselves visually on social media 
platforms. 
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Figure 3. Screenshot of an Instagram post by Justin Trudeau illustrating populist framing 
(mass appeal dimension). 
 
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Theresa May and her challenger Jeremy Corbyn preferred 
similar ideal candidate framing. This is somewhat surprising because May’s campaign emphasized her 
leadership abilities (Prosser, 2018). Corbyn presented himself as more ordinary, F(1, 358) = 7.20, p < .01 
(Figure 4), and he embraced more depictions of himself in a populist frame than May, F(1, 358) = 6.94, p 
< .01. Contrary to May, Corbyn is an enthusiastic and energetic campaigner who has few qualms about 
addressing large audiences and interacting with ordinary people (Dorey, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot of a Facebook post by Jeremy Corbyn illustrating populist framing 
(ordinariness dimension). 
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When comparing ideal candidate framing and populist framing, I found no statistically 
significant differences between Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg and her challenger Jonas Gahr 
Støre. Likewise, there were no significant differences in the frames used by Austrian Chancellor 
Christian Kern and his challenger Sebastian Kurz. Last, the French presidential candidates Emmanuel 
Macron and Marine Le Pen used the ideal candidate frame almost equally. Nevertheless, there were 
notable differences with regard to the statesmanship dimension and the compassion dimension. 
Interestingly, the statesman score was higher for Le Pen than Macron, F(1, 391) = 7.57, p < .01. In 
particular, Le Pen used campaign paraphernalia and patriotic symbols such as the national flag in her 
visual social media posts. By doing so, she visually emphasized the nationalism on which her policies 
are primarily based. Presenting as statesmanlike can be seen as a part of Le Pen’s “detoxification” 
strategy (Durovic, 2019, p. 6), which aimed to create a softer and more reputable image of herself 
and her party. Macron, however, focused more on appearing compassionate than Le Pen, F(1, 391) = 
6.26, p < .05. Even though there were no statistically significant differences between Macron and Le 
Pen in terms of populist framing, Le Pen appeared significantly more often with large audiences. The 
reader may ask whether certain candidate characteristics (e.g., gender, age, ideology, and incumbent 
status) affect the use of the ideal candidate frame and the populist campaigner frame. Therefore, I ran 
additional statistical analyses. However, I did not find any significant effects. 
 
With respect to RQ1, the ANOVA results showed that the use of the ideal candidate frame 
differs significantly among countries, F(6, 2265) = 33.00, p < .001 (Table 3). Though I found cross-
national differences, Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that those differences are rather limited. These 
tests indicated that Germany had the highest use of the ideal candidate frame and differed 
significantly from Austria, Canada, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom (all ps < . 001). The 
United States had the second highest use of the ideal candidate frame and differed significantly from 
those countries (all ps < .001). There were no significant differences between Germany and the United 
States. German chancellor candidates and U.S. presidential candidates presented themselves as 
having ideal qualities almost equally, and more often than candidates in the other countries. Moreover, 
I found that Austria, Canada, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom did not differ significantly from 
each other. 
 
The ANOVAs further revealed that the use of the populist campaigner frame differed 
significantly among countries, F(6, 2265) = 22.18, p < .001. Bonferroni post hoc tests demonstrated 
that German and Canadian candidates relied significantly more often on the populist frame than 
candidates in Austria, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States (all ps < .001). 
Candidates in the United Kingdom presented themselves significantly more often with populist traits 
than candidates in Austria (p < .05) and France (p < .001). There were no significant differences 
among Austria, France, Norway, and the United States with respect to the use of the populist 
campaigner frame. 
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Note. ANOVA with Bonferroni multiple comparisons test. AT = Austria; CA = Canada; FR = France; GER = 
Germany; NO = Norway; UK = United Kingdom; U.S. = United States. 
 
Finally, I analyzed differences in candidates’ use of visual frames among social media platforms 
(RQ2). Table 4 and ANOVA results showed that the use of the ideal candidate frame differs significantly 
among social media platforms, F(2, 2269) = 5.70, p < .01. Post hoc tests indicated that Instagram had the 
highest level of the ideal candidate frame and differed significantly from Facebook (p < .01), but no 
differences were found between Instagram and Twitter. Facebook and Twitter did not differ significantly from 
each other, although Facebook was used less often for ideal candidate depictions. With regard to the populist 
campaigner frame, the ANOVA analyses demonstrated substantial cross-platform differences, F(2, 2269) = 
10.40, p < .001. Post hoc tests showed that Instagram was used significantly more often for candidates’ 
portrayals as populist campaigners than Twitter (p < .01). The results further revealed that Twitter was used 
significantly less to illustrate the populist campaigner frame than Facebook (p < .001). These results suggest 
that Instagram seems to be candidates’ preferred platform for visual self-presentation. 
 
Table 4. Visual Frames by Social Media Platform. 
 
 Facebook  
(n = 1,078) 
Instagram 
(n = 438) 
Twitter 
(n = 756) 
  
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F(df) p 
Ideal Candidate 2.52 (1.44) 2.79(1.58) 2.66 (1.43) F(2, 2269) = 5.70 < .01 
Populist Campaigner 1.44 (1.24) 1.45 (1.21) 1.21 (1.16) F(2, 2269) = 10.40 < .001 




The purpose of the present study is to investigate political candidates’ visual self-presentation 
strategies on their official social media profiles in a comparative perspective. Drawing on Grabe and Bucy’s 
(2009) visual framing approach, I conducted a quantitative content analysis of the visual posts on 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter of the top two candidates who ran for the chief executive government 
office in election campaigns of seven Western democracies: Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, 
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the United Kingdom, and the United States. The results of this investigation show that candidates are 
more likely to use the ideal candidate frame than the populist campaigner frame. This result concurs with 
previous studies indicating that candidates present themselves visually on social media platforms as ideal 
candidates (Cmeciu, 2014; Goodnow, 2013; Muñoz & Towner, 2017). 
 
The second major finding is that there are differences among countries in the use of ideal 
candidate and populist framings, but those differences are limited and nonsystematic. Ideal candidate 
framing seems to be the preferred visual self-presentation strategy in Germany and in the United States. 
The ideal candidate image appears a particularly good fit for Chancellor Merkel, who exhibits a presidential 
style in governing and campaigning. The use of the ideal candidate framing does not differ among Austria, 
Canada, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Populist framing is particularly prevalent among 
German, Canadian, and, to a lesser extent, UK candidates. Populist campaigner depictions are an 
excellent fit for Trudeau, who is popular among Canadians and who enjoys the image of a youthful, 
energetic, and likeable candidate, in contrast to his opponent Harper. The populist campaigner frame is 
used equally in Austria, France, Norway, and the United States. Although the countries studied differ 
significantly in terms of their political and media systems’ characteristics and social media penetrations, it 
seems that the differences among countries are less pronounced than among candidates. Differences in 
the use of visual frames may instead depend on candidate characteristics. One of the most interesting 
results to emerge from this study is that populist candidates such as Trump and Le Pen are more likely to 
frame themselves as an ideal candidate than a populist campaigner. A possible explanation for this might 
be that populist candidates consider themselves the only ones able to adequately represent the people 
and therefore emphasize their statesmanship. By performing the role of a statesman, Trump aims to 
demonstrate to his followers and potential voters that he is a strong leader who is able to govern and to 
deliver on his campaign promises. 
 
Finally, this study identifies the differences that candidates use for their visual framing in the 
studied social media platforms. In particular, the results suggest that Instagram is the preferred platform 
for candidates’ visual self-presentation in election campaigns. In contrast to Facebook and Twitter, 
Instagram is predominantly geared toward the distribution of visual content and is therefore well-suited 
for candidates’ visual representations. Furthermore, this result broadly supports the work of other studies 
on cross-platform social media research in political campaigning, which have shown that campaign content 
differs among social media platforms (Kreiss et al., 2018; Stier et al., 2018). 
 
Even though this study sheds light on how political candidates in seven Western democracies 
strategically use visuals in their social media campaigns, it has some limitations. The main focus of the 
present study lies on the question of what is made salient. Although the content of visual social media posts 
is important for visual framing analyses, this study did not analyze structural features such as camera angle, 
camera distance, and color, which are also relevant to the framing of political candidates (Banning & 
Coleman, 2009; Grabe, 1996). Some researchers therefore stress the importance of not looking only at the 
visual motifs (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018). By investigating structural features, researchers may draw 
conclusions about power and social distance (Coleman, 2010). For instance, low-angle shots are believed to 
attribute power and authority to the portrayed person, whereas high-angle shots attribute weakness to the 
portrayed person. Eye-level shots convey equality between the viewer and the person depicted (Grabe & 
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Bucy, 2009). It is also argued that variations in the camera distance may affect voters’ evaluations of 
political candidates (Bucy & Newhagen, 1999; Kepplinger, 1982; Mutz, 2007). Given that the analysis of 
structural features represents an important aspect of visual framing, future studies should also examine the 
way in which visuals present political candidates. For instance, it can be assumed that the populist 
campaigner frame will use significantly more eye-level camera shots than the ideal candidate frame because 
eye-level shots convey equality between the viewer and the portrayed person. Combining the analysis of the 
content and structural features of visual social media posts may therefore offer insights into the strategic use 
of visuals by political candidates. Moreover, one has to take into account that this study follows a denotative 
deductive approach that theoretically derives two visual character frames from Grabe and Bucy’s (2009) 
visual framing analysis. The present study has shown that these visual frames appear in the sample and that 
Grabe and Bucy’s theoretical framework can be applied to several countries and social media platforms. The 
use of the two visual character frames has also provided important insights and interesting differences in 
political candidates’ visual self-presentation. However, it should be noted that the deductive approach is 
limited to established frames. Thus, diverse and heterogeneous visual representations may be overlooked. 
To take into account the diverse visual material that can be found on social media platforms, future studies 
might combine different approaches to visual framing when investigating political candidates’ visual 
representations. For instance, recent studies in other contexts have shown that the combination of 
denotative, stylistic, connotative, and ideological approaches provides a nuanced perspective on visual 
framing (Hellmueller & Zhang, 2019). Another limitation concerns data collection: I collected the visual social 
media posts in October 2018—in many cases, years after the elections. Collecting data in real time would 
help scholars to establish a greater degree of accuracy on this matter. In particular, the European Parliament 
elections that take place in 28 countries simultaneously offer a major opportunity to collect data in real time. 
Furthermore, this study does not acknowledge the increasing integration of videos and stories within 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. To fully explore the strategic use of visuals in social media campaigning, a 
greater focus on candidates’ self-presentation in videos or stories is needed. By focusing on Western 
democracies, it was not possible to assess the situation in the non-Western world, and therefore, it is 
unknown how candidates in non-Western countries visually present themselves on social media platforms 
during election campaigns. While this study indicates that the use of visual frames is rather limited among 
Western countries, Lee (2016) found substantial cross-national differences between the United States and 
South Korea. Future research might explore differences among candidates’ visual self-presentation in the 
Western and non-Western world. A further issue that was not addressed in this study was whether there is a 
relationship between a specific self-presentation style (i.e., ideal candidate frame or populist campaigner 
frame) and candidate evaluations (e.g., leadership abilities, competence, integrity, empathy, and likeability) 
with respect to voting behavior. Experimental studies could shed light on this question. Finally, future 
research might explore the extent to which candidates’ visually constructed frames find their way into news 
coverage and the relationship between candidate images on social media platforms and in campaign 
coverage. In sum, this study offers some important insights into the strategic use of visuals by political 
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Frame Dimension Variable Krippendorff’s a 
Ideal Candidate    
 Statesmanship   
  Elected officials 0.85 
  Patriotic symbols 0.80 
  Symbols of progress 0.82 
  Identifiable entourage 0.79 
  Campaign paraphernalia 0.89 
  Political hoopla 0.85 
  Formal attire 0.87 
 Compassion   
  Children 0.86 
  Family associations 0.84 
  Admiring women 0.78 
  Religious symbols 0.86 
  Affinity gestures 0.81 
  Interaction with individuals 0.79 
  Physical embraces 0.80 
Populist Campaigner    
 Mass Appeal   
  Celebrities 0.86 
  Large audiences 0.81 
  Approving audiences 0.79 
  Interaction with crowds 0.82 
 Ordinariness   
  Informal attire 0.93 
  Casual dress 0.86 
  Athletic clothing 0.96 
  Ordinary people 0.89 
  Physical activity 0.80 
 
